If we agree that 2000 to 2008 was a bubble, one where prices peaked in 2006 at 84% above the baseline, then where are we now? Prices are 208% of the baseline. To get back to what historically would be considered a normal price for housing, current market prices will need to fall 68%. In other words, if you have a $250,000 house at the peak of this cycle, you may find yourself in a house valued at just $81,000. That is difficult to fathom.
Difficult to fathom does not mean impossible.
It’s instructive to also look at interest rates. A year ago, someone with reasonable credit could get a 30-year mortgage at a 3% interest rate. Historically, that is unprecedented, and it explains a lot of the current bubble. Today, 30-year rates are around 7%, with indications that they may go significantly higher, especially if inflation is persistent.
People purchase homes based on the monthly payment they can afford. Let’s say you are a household that can afford $1,000 a month in a house payment. At a 3% interest rate, you can buy a $237,000 home. At a 7% interest rate, you can only buy a $150,000 home. That’s a 37% reduction in purchasing capacity just from interest rate fluctuation.
Now into that calculation, add broad and persistent increases in local taxes, the kind necessary even to attempt to maintain all of that failing local infrastructure our municipal governments built and are now responsible for. You know, the infrastructure that you depend on to have drinking water, fire protection, a way to get to work, and more.
Add an additional $50 a month in property tax—a laughable amount compared to the backlog of liabilities every city has in the ground—and that same household can no longer pay $150,000 for a home; they can only pay $143,000.
Yet, as the tax base drops by double-digit percentages, what happens to local property tax rates? We watched a mini version of this happen back in 2008, and the implications were too scary to imagine. As prices fall, tax rates go up, prompting further price reductions, and the negative feedback loop that emerges feels a lot like the endgame of the Growth Ponzi Scheme; higher taxes combined with failing services.
And this is all before unemployment starts to rise, which is an inevitable side effect of this economic shift. Go back and look at that Case-Shiller Index and recall the desperation that set in during what was, by comparison, a mild pause in what has been a historic and unprecedented rise in housing prices. Unemployment reached 10% in October 2009, technically after the country had exited the Great Recession. We’re now at 3.7%. Rising unemployment will put further downward pressure on housing prices.